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FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
Jean Braucher* 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
went live on July 21, 2011. Less than three months later, the CFPB 
published its Supervision and Examination Handbook, which outlines, 
among other topics, how the bureau is using its new authority to regulate 
abusive practices as well as unfair and deceptive ones. This Article 
examines the theory underlying the new agency’s anti-abuse regulatory 
power and its early implementation efforts. Armed with insights from 
behavioral economics supported by extensive research, the CFPB is 
targeting credit products designed to exploit consumer error. This new 
approach, based mostly on the substance of deals rather than disclosure, is 
arguably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the 
advent of the modern consumer movement in the 1960s. Some states can be 
expected to follow the federal lead and incorporate “abusive practices” into 
their laws, creating UDAAP powers (for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts 
and practices) that support and extend those of the CFPB. 
*  *  * 
INTRODUCTION 
Bad consumer deals, often structured using complicated and nasty 
terms buried in long forms, are an old problem, and the law has long 
struggled to find adequate tools to deal with them.1 Thus, it comes as good 
news that the fledgling Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is 
honing a brand new tool handed to it by Congress: the concept of abusive 
practices.2 Using insights from behavioral economics, the CFPB is paying 
close attention to the substance of consumer financial products—that is, to 
whether consumers are being exploited.3 The new anti-abuse authority 
                                                                                                                                          
 *  Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona. Thanks to Ted Janger for 
encouraging me to write this piece and to John Pottow for comments on an earlier version. 
 1. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS 362–66 
(1960) (discussing the struggles of courts and legal scholars to deal with the problem of 
overreaching in standard form contracts). 
 2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005, 2006 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5531) (authorizing the CFPB to regulate abusive practices, along with unfair and deceptive 
ones). 
 3. The nature of the theory being used by CFPB is explored in Parts II and III below. 
Although my title echoes Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976), that classic article dealt with dualities in legal thought such as rules 
versus standards and individualism versus a sense of community. My reference to form and 
substance may owe more to Arthur Leff’s exposition of the dimensions of unconscionability as 
involving both form, in the sense of the procedure by which a contract is made, and substance, in 
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shows promise, particularly because the CFPB has incorporated this 
authority into its examination standards, which can be used to pressure 
financial institutions to stop employing exploitative practices and to identify 
practices to target in its enforcement actions.4 
We have long known that consumer assent to standard form terms is 
typically fictional and that common law concepts such as unconscionability, 
involving “case-to-case sniping” as Arthur Leff put it, do not amount to an 
effective technique for controlling the quality of mass contracts when the 
market fails.5 The consumer movement of the 1960s brought a flowering of 
administrative consumer protection at the state and federal levels. However, 
disclosure regulation became its most common, yet insufficient, technique, 
as exemplified by the alphabet soup of regulations written and enforced by 
the Federal Reserve Board.6 Truth in Lending regulation was the most 
intricately disappointing example.7 
                                                                                                                                          
the sense of whether the deal is too one-sided or too harsh on the weaker party. See generally 
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967). Of course, Kennedy’s emphasis on the importance of substantive justice and 
community is reflected in the abiding popularity of consumer protection. See Press Release, Ctr. 
for Responsible Lending, New Poll Shows Broad Support for Financial Reform: 77% of 
Americans Want Tougher Rules for Wall Street (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/New-Poll-Demonstrates 
-Broad-Support-for-Financial-Reform.html (reporting that in a nationwide survey of likely voters, 
93 percent want clearer explanations of credit rates and fees, 77 percent want it to be harder for 
lenders to offer loans with risky or confusing features, and 74 percent want a single consumer 
financial protection agency).  
 4. See CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/themes/cfpb_theme/images/supervision 
_examination_manual_11211.pdf [hereinafter EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011]; see also infra 
note 122 (discussing how the agency links examination to enforcement). 
 5. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law 
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358 (1970) (arguing that the biggest problem with 
unconscionability is the ineffectiveness of case-by-case litigation to address mass problems in 
mass contracts, and arguing that administrative regulation is more effective). Tort law theories, 
such as fraud or misrepresentation, involve a similar problem of dependence on case-by-case 
inquiry into the facts of individual interactions, and, lately, some courts have invented the idea 
that an “economic loss rule” bars use of fraud, or even consumer protection theories, if the parties 
had a contract. See Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: 
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 829, 835–39 (2006) (noting that fraud and consumer protection are quintessentially about 
economic loss, almost always in a contractual context, and that the idea of barring tort or statutory 
recovery in contracts, especially consumer contracts, is based on a mistake in reading dicta of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1980s). 
 6. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, see Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531), and the creation of the CFPB, the Federal Reserve Board had 
primary responsibility for administering consumer protection regulation of financial institutions, 
and it promulgated numerous regulations to do so. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, 
CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW, ch. 5, § 15:2 (West 2011).   
 7. Truth In Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version at 
Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601–1667f (1968)). See generally 
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80 
GEO. L.J. 233 (1991) (discussing the thinking that led to TILA and its limitations); Christopher L. 
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The common law and administrative regulation have too often taken the 
unthreatening approach of primarily focusing on the form rather than the 
substance of bad deals, leaving drafters to recur to the attack.8 The CFPB is 
taking over a vast amount of disclosure regulation,9 and this burden should 
not distract the CFPB from its very important new substantive tools.10 
Two core policy arguments were used to justify creating the CFPB. One 
was the need for a consolidated and independent rule-making and 
enforcement agency with consumer financial protection as its only task to 
avoid both conflict among multiple banking regulators as well as the 
internal conflict of having an agency primarily responsible for regulating 
the safety and soundness of financial institutions also in charge of consumer 
protection; as finally structured, CFPB is a bureau within the Federal 
Reserve Board with financial independence, although not complete 
independence because its regulations can be set aside by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.11 
                                                                                                                                          
Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the 
Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 880–85, 900–01 (2003) (discussing both the 
nonthreatening nature of disclosure regulation to free market ideology and also the point that 
TILA is easily evaded by the use of fees that do not have to be stated in the finance charge or 
annual percentage rate); Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to 
Substantive Regulation in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 615, 616–21 (2012) (discussing early recognition that complexity thwarted 
the effectiveness of TILA, but also noting the lack of sufficient correction by regulators, who only 
renewed their tinkering with disclosures). 
 8. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 364 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 700, 702–03 (1939)) (stating that the difficulty with many techniques for dealing with 
troublesome form clauses, such as construing clauses contrary to their patent meaning, is that 
since they “rest on the admission that the clauses in question are permissible in purpose and 
content, they invite the draftsman to recur to the attack. Give him time, and he will make the 
grade.”). 
 9. The Dodd-Frank Act moved authority over most existing federal consumer financial 
disclosure regulations to the CFPB. Dodd Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). An example of how burdensome designing disclosures can be is 
the eighteen-month-long process of coming up with mortgage application and closing forms, a 
process that began in December 2010 and resulted in release of proposed new disclosures on July 
9, 2012. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 51116 (August 23, 
2012); see also Jeff Sovern, Op-Ed, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/opinion/a-guide-for-the-new-mortgage-form.html 
(discussing the long process of drafting and testing the new disclosures but arguing that many 
consumers will need mortgage counselors to understand the home loans they are offered). For a 
prescient analysis of the inadequacy of disclosure regulation to deal with predatory subprime 
mortgages, one made before the bubble burst, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the 
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 831 (2006) 
(concluding that “[t]he current information-based legal paradigm confuses disclosure with 
knowledge, understanding, and rational choice”). 
 10. See Pridgen, supra note 7, at 627–28 (listing the new substantive regulation of residential 
mortgages included in the Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5531) that the CFPB will oversee). 
 11. See Pridgen, supra note 7, at 625 (discussing the desire for a “non-captive government 
agency” with a primary mission to protect consumers). See also, Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in 
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Although the first policy argument, about the need for a structurally strong 
consumer financial protection agency, is an important one, the type of 
regulation a consumer protection agency pursues is equally important. Even 
dedicated and relentless disclosure regulation can only do so much—it is a 
good first line of defense, but far from sufficient.12 Attention to substance is 
also key. 
The second policy argument for the CFPB, the focus of this article, 
emphasized the type of regulation needed and stressed that consumer 
financial products should be free from “tricks and traps.”13 This rhetoric 
was politically smart because it did not sound like anything daring, perhaps 
calling only for better disclosure to prevent trickery. However, it would 
have been disappointing indeed if the CFPB had turned out to be nothing 
more than a consolidated agency to oversee disclosure regulation. In 
addition to the emphasis on eliminating tricks and traps, however, a related 
rhetorical move used to advocate for creating the CFPB compared financial 
products to toasters and other physical products and argued that both types 
of products should be safe.14 This argument focused more clearly on the 
need for substantive consumer protection. Early CFPB implementation 
efforts suggest that these arguments, against tricks and traps and for 
financial product safety, are two sides of one coin. The CFPB appears 
focused on eliminating financial products that are based on tricks and traps, 
that is, on working to do away with substantively bad, unsafe deals. Also, 
the CFPB is armed with a newly sophisticated theory of what it should be 
doing, as will be explained below in Parts II and III. Thus, the agency is 
poised to make exciting advances in consumer protection. 
In Part I, this Article begins by reviewing theoretical approaches used 
over the course of several millennia to deal with bad consumer deals. 
                                                                                                                                          
Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (at Part II) (discussing restructuring of consumer financial protection to make 
for a stronger, although not completely independent, agency and also the centralization of 
consumer financial protection in the CFPB, rather than having consumer protection authority 
spread among numerous banking regulators), supra note 9, and infra note 109 concerning 
consolidation of consumer financial protection in the CFPB. 
 12. The obvious point that disclosure is insufficient as consumer protection is sometimes used 
as the basis for the arguments that we should do away with disclosure or that we should not worry 
if disclosure is delayed until it is too late to do any good; this is certainly not my position. See Jean 
Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 
WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1809–18 (2000) (discussing the importance of both early disclosure and 
substantive regulation). However, it would have been a waste of political capital to have a 
protracted fight such as that over the Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531), and end up with nothing more in the way of consumer protection 
than a new agency to house disclosure regulation. 
 13. See Elizabeth Warren on Credit Card “Tricks and Traps,” PBS NOW (Jan. 2, 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/501/credit-traps.html. 
 14. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (2008) 
(underscoring the nature of the approach as focused on substance with a different name for the 
proposed agency, the Financial Product Safety Commission); see also infra notes 15 and 90–95 
and accompanying text (discussing the product safety analogy). 
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Policing of the marketplace was substantive for a long time, and disclosure 
regulation was a twentieth century innovation. Part II traces the scholarly 
development of the theory underlying the CFPB’s regulation of abusive 
practices, a theory that refocuses consumer protection on substance. In Part 
III, the Article describes and evaluates the CFPB’s initial mobilization of its 
anti-abuse authority. It concludes that anti-abuse regulation based on 
behavioral economics promises to be an important development, arguably 
the most significant innovation in consumer law in decades.15 
I. THE RISE AND EVENTUAL DOMINANCE OF DISCLOSURE 
The earliest consumer financial protection was substantive—prohibiting 
usury.16 In the ancient world, lending at interest, particularly if at high rates 
for purposes of consumption, was often considered immoral.17 Interest was 
either prohibited or rates were capped at modest levels, although evasion of 
the law was also common.18 Early and medieval Christianity condemned the 
charging of any interest, and usury became a sin punishable by 
excommunication, but various fictions effectively permitted charging 
interest or fees for some loans.19 The practical Protestants loosened the law 
of usury to permit interest that was not “biting” and facilitated trade.20 With 
the rise of the Enlightenment and modern economic thinking, abolition of 
usury laws was the result in England.21 Usury law lingered much longer in 
the United States, particularly in the Bible Belt of the South, but a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in 1978 prompted its effective abolition over the 
                                                                                                                                          
 15. In addition to regulation of consumer credit in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 1601–1700, and in other laws, the consumer movement of the 1960s focused on physical 
product quality regulation, eventually producing both product safety and warranty initiatives in the 
1970s. Like TILA, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312, was too complicated and relied too heavily on disclosure. 
The consumer movement scored better on regulation of product safety, resulting in the creation, in 
1972, of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2073 
(creating the agency and outlining its powers). CPSC is the inspiration for CFPB, but the latter 
also owes much to observation of the failings of the long experiment with disclosure as the 
primary means to regulate credit products. 
 16. James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
61, 64 (1981).  
 17. Id. at 63–71 (recounting moral views about lending at interest as well as legal constraints 
on interest rates applicable in various cultures, including Hebrew, Sumerian, Babylonian, Greek, 
and Roman). 
 18. See id.  
 19. See generally id. at 72–77 (discussing the seriousness with which usury was treated and 
also describing numerous structures used to evade the prohibition, such as use of silent 
partnerships or sale of “annuities,” inflated currency exchange rates, and late payment charges).  
 20. See generally id. at 77–79 (recounting developments during the Reformation and Calvin’s 
interpretation that “the Bible prohibits only ‘biting’ interest that oppresses the poor,” permitting 
moderate interest that facilitated trade).  
 21. See generally id. at 82–85 (discussing the writing of John Locke and Jeremy Bentham, 
especially the latter’s 1787 Letters in Defense of Usury, and the repeal in 1854 in England of all 
acts against usury). 
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next few years, clearing the way for an explosive growth in high cost and 
high risk consumer credit.22 
As a companion to strict usury prohibitions that kept a lid on risky 
consumer credit, the medieval approach to regulation of markets for goods 
and services used authoritarian control of fairness and involved enforced 
communal solidarity against all manner of cheats.23 Local and special courts 
and inspectors exercised paternal solicitude in many ways, for example, in 
the assizes of bread and beer, in oversight of notions of gallons and quarts, 
in proper content of sausages (no pieces of drowned cow allowed), in sizes 
of bricks, and even in policing to see that porters did not stop to play cards 
and backgammon.24 In a foreshadowing of the problem of tricks and traps in 
complicated financial products, authorities looked for physical traps used 
by scamming bakers: 
 
A number of bakers were hailed into court for contriving holes in their 
counters, artfully concealed by ingenious trapdoors, through which their 
customers’ dough was stolen before their very eyes. The makers knew 
their wares; their customers, who were inexpert, did not. The law was 
invoked lest there be deceit of many people having no knowledge of the 
same.25 
 
Caveat emptor was an occasional, mostly late, and contested idea, with 
the law of warranty and deceit contradicting the philosophical pull of 
laissez-faire, which had perhaps its fullest flowering in nineteenth-century 
America.26 In a restless and far-flung population with little recourse to 
magistrates, the law in action left consumers mostly to protect themselves if 
they could. 
Even as the common law of contract became more formal and de-
emphasized substantive fairness, equity pulled the other way. This tension 
produced the doctrine of unconscionability, which became a settled part of 
                                                                                                                                          
 22. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 450–54 (2000) 
(discussing how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the National Bank Act of 1863 in 
Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), led to federal and state 
legislative changes that effectively ended usury regulation except in isolated local pockets). 
Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act, § 1027(o), 124 Stat. 1376, 1995 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o)), 
bars the CFPB from imposing usury limits, but with the implication that other substantive 
regulation is permissible. See infra note 125 and accompanying text discussing this point.  
 23. William H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136 
(1931) (referring ironically in the title to the “ancient maxim,” and explaining, “Caveat emptor is 
not to be found among the reputable ideas of the Middle Ages. As custom of trade or rule of law it 
is not to be met with upon the highways of mediaeval culture. To priest and lord, to yeoman and 
villain, and even to burglar and lawyer, it would have fallen strangely upon the ear. They did not 
talk that language.”).  
 24. Id. at 1142–46.  
 25. Id. at 1151–52 (footnotes omitted).  
 26. Id. at 1171–75, 1178–81.  
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the federal common law by the late nineteenth century.27 When the doctrine 
was included in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was not 
defined other than in a rambling and somewhat contradictory comment.28 
The case law developed the idea that both form (also referred to as 
“procedure,” in the sense of the process by which a contract was entered 
into) and substance mattered.29 Application of the flexible doctrine has, of 
course, varied. The case law in some places has developed a “sliding scale” 
approach to unconscionability, requiring less of one type of unfairness 
where there is more of the other kind.30 One state’s highest court has noted 
the lack of any mention of procedure in the language of section 2-302 itself 
and concluded that unconscionability can be found on the basis of 
substantive unfairness alone, an approach followed by a sprinkling of other 
courts.31 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also recognized 
unconscionability.32 In addition, it included an innovative doctrine, derived 
from a scholarly analysis by Karl Llewellyn, concerning unenforceability of 
standard-form terms contrary to reasonable expectations.33 While the black 
letter of the Restatement’s section 211(3) could be read narrowly, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) restatements are not statutes; as to this 
provision, a comment makes clear that the ALI endorses a broad concept 
that parties to standard form contracts “are not bound to unknown terms 
which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”34 The black letter 
test—which is whether there was “reason to believe the adhering party 
                                                                                                                                          
 27. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236–37 (1892) (refusing specific enforcement 
of an unconscionable contract in a case involving diversity of citizenship of the parties); Hume v. 
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889) (refusing to enforce a contract with an unconscionable 
price charged to a federal agency); see also 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 703 (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing lack of enforcement in equity of unconscionable contracts). 
 28. UNIF.COMMERCIALCODE § 2-302, cmt. 1 (including the idea that clauses in contracts 
should not be “so one-sided as to be unconscionable” and that this should be judged “under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract,” and also that “[t]he principle is 
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise” and “not of disturbance of allocation of 
risks because of superior bargaining power”; the focus on one-sidedness and oppression suggests a 
substantive test, while the focus on the circumstances at the time of making and on unfair surprise 
suggests a procedural test). 
 29. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 
1965); see also Leff, supra note 3, at 486–88.  
 30. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he 
more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability 
is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”). 
 31. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (“[E]vidence that the dual 
requirement position is more coincidental than doctrinal is found within the very text of the statute 
on unconscionability, which explicitly refers to ‘the contract or any clause of the contract.’ . . . 
Conspicuously absent from the statutory language is any reference to procedural aspects.”); see 
also, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 33. Id. § 211(3). See infra notes 37–46 and accompanying text concerning the origins of this 
doctrine in the work of Llewellyn. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. f. (1981). 
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would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the agreement 
contained the particular term”—is expanded by the comment, which states 
that “reason to believe” can be filled in by inference: 
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or 
oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms 
explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant 
purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the adhering 
party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or 
otherwise hidden from view. This rule is closely related to the policy 
against unconscionable terms . . . .35 
While the reasonable expectations doctrine has a primarily substantive 
thrust, it also embodies an idea of extraordinarily effective disclosure as a 
means to avoid creating expectations; for example, a party with knowledge 
of a harsh term can hardly claim that it was contrary to his or her reasonable 
expectations.36 As we shall see, this is why the concept of “abusive 
practices” is so important: parties can know of a term but not appreciate 
how it will affect them. Trickery need not involve nondisclosure or even 
buried disclosure; rather, it can be based on exploiting another’s lack of 
understanding of what has been clearly disclosed as well as consumer 
errors, such as underestimation of future credit use. 
The origins of the reasonable expectations doctrine are in the 
jurisprudential work of Llewellyn, who recognized that standard form 
contracts present a challenge to a contract theory grounded in mutual 
assent.37 He took on the difficult question of how we can see an adhering 
party as agreeing, even objectively, to form terms that the drafter knows the 
adhering party did not read or otherwise know about. Llewellyn’s 
theoretical solution was what he called “blanket assent,” as distinguished 
from specific assent to “the few dickered terms, and the broad transaction 
type.”38 Blanket assent, he argued, is given 
to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form. 
. . . The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the 
                                                                                                                                          
 35. Id.; see also Braucher, supra note 12, at 1814–18 (discussing Karl Llewellyn’s concept of 
blanket assent, discussed infra at notes 37–46 and accompanying text, and the Restatement’s 
reasonable expectations doctrine as involving more substantive policing than mixed procedure-
and-substance unconscionability). 
 36. It is interesting that in Arizona, which has a robust general doctrine of reasonable 
expectations not limited to the insurance context, unconscionability is treated as a theory that can 
be used on the basis of substantive unfairness alone, see supra note 31, while the reasonable 
expectations doctrine is treated as a mixed matter of substance and process. See Jean Braucher, 
Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court’s Grand Tradition of Transaction Fairness, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 213–21 (discussing how the Arizona court defined reasonable expectations and 
unconscionability). 
 37. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 362 (discussing the problem of form “Agreement” with the 
scare quotes in the heading of the original). 
 38. Id. at 370.  
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reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant 
and only real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs 
in.39 
If one focuses on Llewellyn’s support for throwing out unreasonable 
terms, one may miss the real thrust of this passage: that, in his view, most 
of what is in a form should be enforced. But why? Is it really about assent? 
The answer, explained earlier in the same section of Llewellyn’s book, The 
Common Law Tradition, is decidedly in the negative. Instead, one finds a 
paean to business efficiency, with the emphasis on the convenience of the 
business drafting the form, not on the adhering party’s assent: 
The impetus to the form-pad is clear, for any business unit: by 
standardizing terms, and by standardizing even the spot on the form where 
any individually dickered term appears, one saves all the time and skill 
otherwise needed to dig out and record the meaning of variant language; 
one makes check-up, totaling, follow-through, etc., into routine 
operations; one has duplicates (in many colors) available for the 
administration of a multidepartment business; and so on more.40 
Llewellyn was deeply sympathetic to businesses’ desire for flexibility 
to create their own certainty. He romantically believed that businesses 
would, on the whole, refrain from acting unreasonably or indecently, so that 
a light hand of constraint would be sufficient. He was even willing to 
concede that he was picturing not agreement but “private government in the 
lesser transactions of life.”41 To serve business efficiency, he built his 
“blanket assent” theory. So here is the kicker: blanket assent is a fiction, 
albeit a convenient one, and is not about any real assent of the adhering 
party but is rather about the perceived needs of the business doing the 
drafting.42 In other words, our best explanation of standard forms as 
contractual, as about agreement—by the leading American legal realist no 
less—is constructed around fictional assent. 
Of course, Llewellyn recognized the need for remedies against 
unreasonable forms. He said the problem was real, sometimes amounting to 
“flagrant trickery,”43 but he also hoped that judicial policing would largely 
be sufficient, while acknowledging that perhaps it would not be. 
Concluding his hymn of praise for standard forms as a means to save time 
and skill, he wrote, “It would be a heart-warming scene, a triumph of 
private attention to what is essentially private self-government in the lesser 
transactions of life or in those areas too specialized for the blunt, slow tools 
of the legislature—if only all businessmen and all their lawyers would be 
                                                                                                                                          
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 362.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 362–63. 
 43. Id. at 363.  
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reasonable.”44 He referred also to “gentlemanly restraint” as well as fully 
negotiated trade rules as solutions.45 
Thus, there is an even bigger problem with Llewellyn’s theory of 
standard form contracts than its core fiction of “blanket assent.” It is also an 
unrealistic way to think about business norms in the face of intense market 
competition; more than weak judicial policing is needed if we want 
businesses to be able to act decently. It should be noted that Llewellyn was 
mostly focused on contracts between two businesses; he was not 
expounding a theory of consumer contracts in particular.46 Without deep 
investigation, it is hard to say whether businesses were more reasonable and 
decent in their standard form deals when Llewellyn wrote in the mid-
twentieth century than they are today. Llewellyn may have been naïve, as 
well as romantic, about business culture even then. But, carrying his theory 
forward to today clearly makes no sense in many realms, particularly that of 
consumer finance, which has one of the most ruthless industry cultures of 
all, a product of stiff competition to attract investors seeking the highest 
possible returns.47 We cannot expect credit card issuers to act with 
gentlemanly restraint; competitive conditions have driven them to create a 
business model that has been described as a debt “sweatbox.”48 
The common law has proved incapable of doing better than developing 
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations as ways to 
police bad standard form deals. Furthermore, common law methodology, no 
matter the details of the doctrine, is unequal to the task of policing lender 
exploitation of consumers. 
                                                                                                                                          
 44. Id. at 362.  
 45. Id. at 363. 
 46. Llewellyn mostly used business-to-business examples, but lumped in a few consumer 
examples too, such as apartment leases and installment sales of appliances; but, in his consumer 
examples, Llewellyn also referred to the fact that legislative intervention was underway. Id. at 
362, 366. Llewellyn had earlier written specifically about consumer protection as an enormous 
problem beyond the capacity of common law methodology, and thus one that called for the 
incisive diagnosis and efficient treatment that a statute can provide. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 67–68 (1989). For why this is referred to as “earlier” writing, see 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA ix–x (1989), explaining that the 
original edition of this book was published in German in 1933 based on lectures given in 1928–
1929. 
 47. Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 334–36 (2006) (discussing the hard-edged nature of the culture 
of the consumer credit industry, in which competition forces lenders to go to the limits of what the 
law allows). 
 48. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 375, 384–92 (2007) (describing how credit card issuers make the most money on 
borrowers who become distressed and pay high interest on their balances for a period of time, 
even if they eventually default); see infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing further 
the predatory nature of the sweatbox business model). See also Jean Braucher, The Sacred and 
Profane Contracts Machine: The Complex Morality of Contract Law in Action, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 667, 684–88 (discussing moral ideas in business and how competition can force business 
persons to act amorally, so that regulation is needed to permit them to act decently). 
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The consumer movement produced administrative regulation, much of 
it involving disclosure.49 Lately, there has also been a turn to specific 
substantive requirements, such as in the Card Act50 and in recent mortgage 
regulation.51 While this is promising because businesses tend to avoid 
violating explicit commands,52 more flexible approaches are also needed to 
address the creativity of consumer creditors in coming up with new ways to 
trap hapless borrowers. This problem demands regulation that can nip in the 
bud innovations in exploitation. For this part of the task, administratively 
policed general standards are needed. 
Open-textured and potentially anticipatory consumer protection 
regulation has long been the province of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), with its mission to police unfair and deceptive practices.53 The FTC 
has defined each of these concepts as best as it could, particularly given the 
pressures of industry-influenced congressional oversight.54 As will be 
discussed in Part III of this Article, both deception and unfairness can have 
elements of nondisclosure, but unfairness in particular goes somewhat 
beyond an approach focused on form. Unfortunately, the FTC never had 
authority to police directly the deception and unfairness practiced by 
financial institutions.55 The Dodd-Frank Act has solved this problem by 
                                                                                                                                          
 49. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, 
CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 
228–30 (Little, Brown and Co. 1995) (discussing history of disclosure regulation and its full 
flowering with administrative implementation of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968). 
 50. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
24, 124 Stat. 1743 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see ADAM J. LEVITIN, THE 
CREDIT C.A.R.D. ACT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR CREDIT UNIONS 1–2 (Filene 
Research Institute, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544885 (describing most 
significant provisions of the law as involving limits on changes in terms and on fees that can be 
charged).  
 51. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 627–35; see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 52. William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize 
Effectiveness, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1981) (noting the tendency of merchants to do what 
they are specifically directed by statute to do out of “belief in law-abidingness and fear of bad 
publicity,” and also discussing generally the mostly symbolic effect of vague, admonitory 
legislation that depends on private rights of actions for enforcement). 
 53. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (codified as amended 2006) 
(including, in particular, § 45, which addresses unfair or deceptive acts and practices). 
 54. Unfairness is now defined in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4), which codifies an FTC policy statement 
made in Letter to Senators Ford & Danforth, Consumer Subcommittee, Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in In re Int’l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 
1070 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Unfairness Policy Statement]; see also Jean Braucher, Defining 
Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 
349, 405–12 (1988) (discussing the political pressures that led to the Unfairness Policy Statement 
and discussing its analysis). Deception is defined in the FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception, 
Letter to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee 
on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted as applied to In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Deception Policy Statement]. 
 55. See generally Julie L. Williams & William S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal 
Banking Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by 
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giving the CFPB authority to address unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices of financial institutions and, for good measure, Dodd-Frank added 
abusive practices, too.56 Now, one agency has power to require disclosure 
under the Truth in Lending Act and to regulate unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices. The regulatory mission is not merely disclosure, but 
consumer protection, broadly and flexibly defined.57 
This broad definition of mission is needed more now than ever. Indeed, 
as will be described in the next section, the consumer credit industry has 
become driven by a science of studying and exploiting patterns of consumer 
error. In the fight against over-indebtedness, we need regulation of the 
credit industry to reduce this sort of lending.58 This is where the CFPB’s 
new authority to regulate abusive practices comes in, but first it will be 
helpful to understand the theory behind the CFBP’s anti-abuse power. 
II. THE THEORY OF ABUSIVENESS AND ITS SUBSTANTIVE 
FOCUS 
A rich body of theoretical and empirical work supports the need for 
regulation of abusive extensions of credit. The idea that lenders should not 
abuse borrowers by extending overly risky credit can be traced back at least 
to the advocacy of Vern Countryman in the 1960s, when he chaired a 
committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) formed to 
propose improvements in the wage earner plan under Chapter XIII of the 
Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of today’s Chapter 13 repayment plan 
form of bankruptcy.59 Countryman was concerned that consumer finance 
companies were inducing debtors not to disclose their full indebtedness by 
using forms that only provided space to list a few debts, sometimes 
followed by a printed line saying “we have no other debts.”60 He saw this 
practice as a trick designed to manufacture bankruptcy nondischargeability 
due to a debtor’s use of a false financial statement to obtain credit.61 More 
                                                                                                                                          
Banks, 58 BUS. LAW. 1243 (2003) (discussing various banking agencies’ use of their authority to 
regulate unfair and deceptive practices).  
 56. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005, 2006 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).  
 57. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 283–84 (critiquing the legislative drive for TILA as based on a 
premise that its goal was disclosure, with insufficient evaluation of whether disclosure would 
achieve consumer protection). 
 58. Braucher, supra note 47, at 342–46 (discussing the structural and cultural dimensions of 
both creditor and debtor behavior and arguing that the least promising way to address 
overindebtedness is by efforts to change informally the culture of the consumer credit industry; 
because the industry operates under competitive conditions, regulation affecting its structure is 
more promising, although politically challenging). 
 59. Margaret Howard, Vern Countryman and Barry Zaretsky: A Legacy of Ideas, 75 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 283, 296 (2001); see also Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New 
Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1975). 
 60. Countryman, supra note 59, at 3.  
 61. Id. at 3–4.  
2012] Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection 119 
broadly and importantly, he was also concerned that creditors were not 
checking credit reports maintained by credit bureaus to find out about total 
indebtedness or were ignoring information creditors did collect.62 As a 
result, he proposed two defenses to creditors’ claims in bankruptcy: 
unconscionability and improvident extension of credit.63 Only 
unconscionability made it into the 1966 NBC proposal,64 but Countryman 
later wrote an article in which he expanded his analysis of creditor 
improvidence.65 
Countryman was concerned with a consumer credit business model 
based on “volume rather than on thorough credit investigation.”66 This was 
the essence of what he termed improvident extension of credit, which he 
defined as extending credit “where it cannot reasonably be expected that the 
debtor can repay the debt according to its terms” in view of “circumstances 
of the debtor at the time the credit was extended . . . known to the creditor 
or [that] would have been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to the 
credit extension.”67 The objects of his concern were “gullible or necessitous 
debtors” who took on impossible debt burdens, as well as their “responsible 
creditors.”68 While conceding that debtors are also responsible for taking 
out loans they cannot afford, he packed an elaborate economic analysis, one 
that behavioral economists have since documented, into one sentence: 
“Although both the debtor and the offending creditor have been 
improvident, typically the creditor is the better equipped—by education, 
experience, resources, and the nature of his role—to avoid and distribute the 
risk of improvidence.”69 Although he considered the desirability of a tort 
claim, not just a contract defense, that could be asserted outside bankruptcy 
to recover all losses brought on by resulting overindebtedness, Countryman 
focused on creating a cause of action for improvidence in bankruptcy 
because such a cause of action would provide a ready means of recovering 
the losses and returning them to the estate for the benefit of all creditors.70 
At the core of Countryman’s concept of improvident lending, then, is 
the idea that a creditor has a responsibility to evaluate borrowers’ ability to 
repay, so as to protect debtors as well as other creditors. The essence of 
predatory lending is extending credit to those who can be expected to 
default, and creditors who fail to evaluate creditworthiness know that they 
are setting up some of their customers for a fall. Creditors can make money 
                                                                                                                                          
 62. Id. at 5–6.  
 63. Id. at 8–9.  
 64. Id. at 8–10.  
 65. See generally id. (developing the idea that creditors should evaluate their debtors’ ability to 
repay and advocating a bankruptcy remedy for improvident lending).  
 66. Id. at 2.  
 67. Id. at 23.  
 68. Id. at 9.  
 69. Id. at 17.  
 70. Id. at 20–21.  
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on such credit in various ways—on volume, as Countryman noted, or 
alternatively by having substantial collateral or, as we shall see, by charging 
high interest for long enough that eventual default does not cause a loss.71  
In the wake of a mortgage crisis brought on by “no doc” and “liar” 
loans and similar subprime mortgage products offered with little or no 
underwriting of the risk of default, the concept that lenders must evaluate 
ability to pay has finally been explicitly embraced in federal consumer 
financial protection law.72 Assessment of ability to pay became a 
requirement for all mortgage originators under the Dodd-Frank Act.73 Also, 
the Federal Reserve Board had earlier adopted this standard, effective 
October 1, 2009, for most high-cost mortgage loans.74 Furthermore, 
Congress directly required credit card issuers to determine ability to pay by 
legislation in 2009.75 Thus, it is fair to say that Countryman has been 
posthumously triumphant, as powerful ex ante statutory and administrative 
regulation now goes far beyond his proposals for ex post tort and 
bankruptcy remedies. 
Countryman focused on the most obvious abusive practices of his day, 
but what has happened since involves a whole new level of sophisticated 
abuse by design. In an analysis predating the bursting of the housing bubble 
fueled by predatory lending, John Pottow picked up on this change in credit 
industry practices in an article published in 2007 that reacted to Congress’s 
steps in the 2005 bankruptcy law to get tough on debtors.76 He argued that 
if we really want to reduce bankruptcy, it would be more effective to get 
tough on creditors, who are better positioned to reduce the bad credit that 
causes it.77 He proposed reviving Countryman’s idea of improvident credit, 
renaming it “reckless credit” to emphasize that more than negligence is 
involved.78 
Pottow based his calls for both a contract defense and a tort cause of 
action for reckless credit on insights of behavioral economics and on 
                                                                                                                                          
 71. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 72. See generally John E. Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175 (2011) 
(discussing origins of the new regulations, their mechanics, and their normative justification). See 
also KATHLEEN C. ENGLE & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 35–38 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (discussing 
loose underwriting and lack of documentation in the run-up to the mortgage crisis). 
 73. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1639c).  
 74. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31–226.39 (2010) (regulation Z, subpart E); see Jean Braucher, Humpty 
Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 734–35, 734 n.28 (2010) 
(concerning the belated adoption of this rule after the mortgage crisis). 
 75. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
24, § 109, 123 Stat. 1734, 1743 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 76. John E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
405, 406 (2007). 
 77. Id. at 406–07. 
 78. Id. at 428.  
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research into the business model known as the “sweatbox” of consumer 
credit.79 Behavioral economics analysis posits that creditors have 
comparative advantages over debtors both in avoiding cognitive biases, 
such as debtors’ underestimation of their future credit use and optimism 
about their financial prospects in general, and in creditors’ superior access 
to information to evaluate risk.80 Pottow’s analysis of the troublesome 
business model focused on industry reliance on defaulters for profitability 
by luring customers with low initial rates and then cranking up the heat on 
“sweaters” by charging late payment fees and penalty rates, making a lot of 
money on them before they eventually default.81 
Pottow might be criticized for an almost quaint endorsement of the use 
of the common law to regulate creditors; he even extolled case-by-case 
policing in the mold of unconscionability.82 But this line of attack would be 
to miss that Pottow stresses that his proposal is “complementary, not 
exclusive.”83 His advocacy for complementary approaches suggests that we 
may need, along with CFPB administrative oversight to prevent abuse, 
something like a cause of action for reckless credit extension to provide 
private rights of action, but perhaps implemented by state statutes rather 
than common law. This could be done by amendment of the state statutes 
addressing unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAPs)—sometimes 
called “little FTC acts”—to add abusive acts and practices and cover all 
three types of practices (hence, UDAAPs), so that in addition to CFPB 
regulation, there would be state-level administrative enforcement and 
statutory private rights of action with multiple damages and attorneys’ 
fees.84  Alternatively, even without statutory amendment, state consumer 
protection agencies and courts could interpret the deliberately flexible 
phrases “deceptive practices” and “unfair practices” to encompass 
abusiveness as developed by CFPB, particularly in light of advances in our 
research-based understanding of the mechanisms of consumer exploitation. 
For his analysis of reckless credit, Pottow drew upon Oren Bar-Gill’s 
work applying the insights of behavioral economics to explain credit card 
                                                                                                                                          
 79. See Mann, supra note 48, at 384–92. 
 80. See Pottow, supra note 76, at 431–34. 
 81. Id. at 415–17.  
 82. Id. at 426–29, 434.  
 83. Id. at 435.  
 84. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1041, 124 Stat. 1376, 2011–12 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551) (making clear that Dodd-Frank establishes a federal floor and does 
not preclude states from providing consistent additional protection, including greater consumer 
protection); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority 
to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 922–25 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s 
anti-preemption provision and the possibility that states could interpret their UDAP statutes to also 
cover abusive practices and use CFPB authority as persuasive authority). On the other hand, 
adding “abusive acts and practices” to a state’s UDAP statute could do this explicitly. See also 
generally CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (2008 & 
2011 Supp.) (discussing both federal and state UDAP law and their interaction). 
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pricing.85 In Seduction by Plastic, Bar-Gill examined the complex mix of 
fees and rates used by card issuers, which included at the time of his 
investigation “low introductory rates that appear alongside high long-term 
interest rates, zero annual and per-transaction fees, large penalties for late 
payments and for deviations from the credit limit, and low (and even 
negative) amortization rates.”86 Bar-Gill argued that these pricing practices 
reflected a studied exploitation of consumers’ underestimation of their own 
likelihood of running a balance and other consumer errors, such as thinking 
they would switch to a lower-rate card before the teaser rate ran out.87 He 
noted that such complex pricing practices can be a telltale sign of 
exploitation in consumer markets more generally, even beyond the realm of 
credit products.88 While challenging a position favoring nonintervention, 
Bar-Gill put off making a particular regulatory proposal and awaited the 
opportunity for further analysis.89 
Following the mortgage crisis, Bar-Gill and coauthor Elizabeth Warren 
returned to the concerns of his earlier article and took on the prescriptive 
task. They argued, in Making Credit Safer, for an administrative agency 
with ex ante power to prevent consumer exploitation by lenders offering 
unsafe credit products.90 This article is sometimes remembered for the use 
of a toaster analogy, that is, the idea that consumer financial products 
should have to be safe just as physical products must be. While the toaster 
analogy is used in the introduction and elsewhere in Making Credit Safer,91 
it originally comes from an earlier advocacy piece by Warren.92 
More significantly, Making Credit Safer lays out a vast amount of 
empirical support, taken from studies conducted by many researchers, for 
the proposition that creditors have exploited consumer errors systematically 
and designed traps to make consumers pay more than they expected.93 Bar-
                                                                                                                                          
 85. See Pottow, supra note 76, at 418 & n.60 (citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)). See also Pridgen, supra note 11, at pts. III.A, III.B (discussing 
CFPB’s greater reliance on insights of behavioral economics and consequent de-emphasis of 
disclosure regulation). 
 86. Bar-Gill, supra note 85, at 1374.  
 87. Id. at 1376.  
 88. Id. at 1379, 1428–34 (discussing how exploitation of consumer biases is not limited to the 
credit card industry or even consumer credit).  
 89. Id. at 1378, 1411–27 (discussing reasons for intervention and possible means of doing so).  
 90. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 98 (making a proposal for such an agency).  
 91. Id. at 7 (noting that “[t]oday, consumers can enter the market to buy physical products, 
confident that they will not be deceived into buying exploding toasters . . . . Consumers entering 
the market to buy financial products should enjoy the same benefits.”).  
 92. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (opening with an analogy between a toaster 
bursting into flames and a mortgage with a high risk of putting the family out on the street). 
 93. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at Part I.B (setting forth evidence that markets for 
consumer credit products are failing). 
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Gill and Warren also examined why disclosure regulation will not work.94 
Here, the toaster analogy is useful because no one thinks the primary and 
best way to regulate against dangerous toasters is better disclosure about 
their risks. Also, despite their homey familiarity, toasters are surprisingly 
complex—most of us will never understand exactly how they work—but 
we want and expect them to be safe.95 
The rich description of pricing practices in Making Credit Safer draws 
on examples involving credit cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans. 
Credit cards provide perhaps the most interesting example, because 
practices were so different before and after the beginning of the Great 
Recession as the industry adjusted to changing consumer preoccupations. 
Credit card pricing used to focus on low teaser rates to get debtors into the 
sweatbox.96 After the Great Recession, and the reduced consumer 
confidence that followed, creditors adapted to consumers’ caution about 
debt by emphasizing lower long-term rates while adding many extra 
charges to which consumers did not pay attention.97 
During the housing bubble, subprime mortgage lenders emphasized low 
or zero down payments, with low interest for two or three years that then 
reset to a high rate.98 Once again, creditors used low initial rates in the same 
way cheese is used in a mousetrap. Many consumers failed to appreciate the 
risk and also failed to refinance when they could, so that they were caught 
by falling home values when the housing market snapped.99 Another form 
of consumer error, a particularly gross one, was common—taking out a 
subprime loan when the borrower could have qualified for a prime one.100 
                                                                                                                                          
 94. Id. at Part I.A (concerning the limits of consumer learning); see also Lauren E. Willis, 
Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, pt. II (2008) (pointing out that 
advocates of financial literacy education lack empirical support that this type of education works 
to change behavior, and questioning the plausibility of its premises given the gap between the 
skills needed to understand complex financial products and the general educational attainment of 
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 95. See generally THOMAS THWAITES, THE TOASTER PROJECT—OR A HEROIC ATTEMPT TO 
BUILD A SIMPLE ELECTRIC APPLIANCE FROM SCRATCH (2011) (detailing the author’s attempt to 
build a toaster from scratch by crafting and assembling more than 400 parts). See also Michael 
Hanlon, Killers in your Kitchen: Gender-bending Packaging, Exploding Floor Cleaners and 
Toasters More Deadly than Sharks, DAILYMAIL.COM (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.dailymail 
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are killed by their toasters, compared to eight or nine by sharks,” suggesting that toasters remain 
appliances to handle with caution). 
 96. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 33–37 (discussing use of teaser rates, with consumers 
making mistakes both in not switching before the introductory rate expired and in making 
calculations about the benefits of the teaser as opposed to the long-term rate for their eventual use 
patterns). 
 97. Id. at 46–52 (noting proliferating additional fees).  
 98. Id. at 53–54 (concerning low down payments and initial rates).  
 99. Id. (discussing failures to make optimal refinancing decisions).  
 100. Id. at 38–39 (concerning various surveys indicating that 35 to 50 percent of subprime 
borrowers could have obtained prime mortgages).  
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Errors in the use of payday loans are also common—including using high-
cost payday loans when liquid assets or cheaper credit products are 
available and getting trapped by the fact that these loans do not typically 
provide for installment repayment—resulting in multiple rollovers with a 
new fee charged each time.101 
With all three of these credit products, regulation by disclosure often 
fails to work for an array of reasons. Complexity and variety prevent 
transparency.102 Even when creditors try to explain complex features, they 
cannot always get through to consumers.103 Constant changes in terms make 
pricing opaque.104 Furthermore, segmentation of the market means that  
savvy borrowers who shop for better terms do not police the market on 
behalf of non-shoppers, so that creditors can market worse deals to the less 
educated, the poor, and racial minorities.105 Disclosure also fails to work 
because consumers mispredict their own future use of credit; creditors, 
meanwhile, make a science of studying consumers and adapting to their 
patterns, pricing low what consumers are currently paying attention to while 
charging high prices for things consumers do not believe they will use but 
which they later end up using.106 
Based on their exploration of research into industry practices, Bar-Gill 
and Warren argued that specific, frozen substantive regulation would not 
work to address exploitation of consumer error; they advocated creation of 
an agency that could respond quickly to market innovation in design of 
credit products.107 In sum, Making Credit Safer provides the regulatory 
analysis for why the CFPB is needed and a blueprint for what it should be 
doing, particularly with its power over abusive lending practices.108 
                                                                                                                                          
 101. Id. at 44–45 and 55–56 (discussing high rollover rates among payday loan customers and 
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Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 596–608 (2010) (discussing 
empirical findings concerning consumers’ lack of understanding of payday loans and their 
conduct in using them). 
 102. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that one issuer alone, Bank of America, 
offered more than 400 credit card options). 
 103. Id. at 20 (concerning Citibank’s efforts to try to get credit card customers to understand the 
benefits of not having universal default clauses or any-time interest rate changes).  
 104. Id. at 13 (discussing the cost of acquiring information when terms change frequently).  
 105. Id. at 7 (concerning customization of products to undercut the policing effect of an 
informed minority); id. at 43 (concerning the better deals obtained by the college-educated); id. at 
64–66 (concerning targeting the less educated, the poorer, and racial minorities to receive higher-
priced products, even controlling for their risk factors); id. at 69 (noting that the wealthy are more 
commonly insulated from exploitation). 
 106. Id. at 23 (discussing superior information access of creditors, who amass vast data and 
make a science of analyzing it); id. at 79 (concerning constant market innovation).  
 107. Id. at 79, 84–85, 98 (discussing the problem that specific statutes do not lend themselves to 
regulatory adaptation needed to avoid lagging far behind the market, and calling for an agency 
that can respond quickly).  
 108. This is unsurprising, given that Elizabeth Warren, one of the two co-authors, was 
responsible for standing up the CFPB as a White House advisor. See Elizabeth Warren, Standing 
Up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 6:00 
2012] Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection 125 
III. CFPB ROLLS OUT ITS ANTI-ABUSE AUTHORITY 
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFPB authority to regulate UDAAPs, an 
acronym that requires a drawl to pronounce, but the agency has not been 
slow to roll out its new anti-abuse authority in its Examination Handbook, 
released in October 2011—less than three months after the agency went live 
on July 21, 2011.109 The section giving the CFPB UDAAP powers picks up 
concepts of unfair or deceptive acts or practices from the FTC Act and adds 
abusive acts or practices to the list.110 For unfairness, the section uses the 
same statutory definition as in the FTC Act.111 Deception is not defined in 
either Dodd-Frank or the FTC Act, but the CFPB has defined it in the same 
way as the FTC Deception Policy does.112 
Unfairness, deception, and abusiveness are overlapping standards, but 
the overlap does not matter much because any one of them is sufficient to 
find a violation of the law.113 The three-part statutory test for unfairness is: 
(1) substantial consumer injury (which can be by small injury to many 
consumers), (2) that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and (3) that 
is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition.114 The three-
part administrative test of deception is: (1) a material (2) representation, 
omission, act, or practice that misleads, or is likely to mislead, the 
consumer, and (3) that the consumer’s misinterpretation is or would be 
reasonable under the circumstances.115 The differences between unfairness 
and deception are subtle, with the emphasis in unfairness on substantial 
injury and whether the consumer can avoid it, and the emphasis in 
deception on the likelihood of misleading. The CFPB has given examples 
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the FTC Unfairness Policy Statement). 
 112. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 1–9; FTC Deception Policy 
Statement, supra note 54.  
 113. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (stating the 
three standards in the disjunctive); see also EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at 
UDAAP 9 (“abusive acts also may be unfair or deceptive”). 
 114. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). 
 115. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 5 (citing the FTC 
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of each drawn from federal enforcement actions.116 The examples of 
unfairness involve not releasing a lien after final payment on a mortgage, 
dishonoring credit card convenience checks without notice, and processing 
payments for companies engaged in fraudulent activities.117 The examples 
of deception involve inadequate disclosure of material vehicle lease terms 
in television advertising and misrepresentation of loan terms.118 
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act also gives the CFPB authority to 
regulate abusive acts or practices; in addition, Dodd-Frank defines 
abusiveness by requiring that the act or practice: 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a 
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to 
act in the interests of the consumer.119 
The abusiveness test thus gives four disjunctive grounds for finding 
abusiveness, making any one of them sufficient. In light of Bar-Gill and 
Warren’s analysis,120 as well as the language about taking “unreasonable 
advantage” of consumers’ “lack of understanding” of risks, costs, or 
conditions of a financial product or service,121 the emphasis seems to be on 
whether the creditor or other service provider is exploiting consumer error 
rather than on mere nondisclosure. Disclosure does not seem to be good 
enough if consumers still do not understand. Furthermore, supporting this 
analysis, the CFPB has stressed that consumer complaints alleging lack of 
understanding of the terms of a product or service may be “a red flag” for 
examiners.122 
The CFPB further fleshed out its understanding of its UDAAP powers 
in a risk assessment template, which sets forth the basis by which it will 
                                                                                                                                          
 116. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 3, 7. 
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evaluate risk to consumers and ultimately decide whether to use its 
enforcement powers.123 Particularly revealing is the first section of the 
template concerning “Nature and Structure of Products,” which sets out the 
following list of “factors that specifically increase the risk that unfair, 
deceptive, abusive acts or practices, discrimination, or other violations of 
Federal consumer financial law will occur”: 
The profitability of a product is dependent upon penalty fees (e.g., fees for 
a late payment, for exceeding a credit limit, or for overdrawing deposited 
funds). 
The terms of the product are subject to change at the discretion of the 
entity, and the entity has frequently made changes in the terms. 
The entity reverses fees at a significantly higher rate than other entities of 
similar size offering similar products. 
Pricing structure (interest rate, points, fees) and other features and terms 
are combined in a manner that is likely to make the total costs of the 
product difficult for consumers to understand. 
Products are bundled in a way that may obscure relative costs. 
Consumers pay penalties to terminate a relationship, including forgoing 
money or benefits they would otherwise earn. 
Consumers face barriers to information, such as costs to access customer 
service or information about their account. 
Credit decision-makers have wide discretion over setting terms and 
features of products with inadequate policies and procedures addressing 
appropriate exercise of that discretion. 
Credit products are not underwritten based upon the likely ability of the 
consumer to make the required (or, in the case of adjustable rate products, 
potentially required) payments over the term of the loan.124 
This list, which is quite consistent with the concerns expressed in the 
Bar-Gill and Warren article discussed in Part II above, suggests that the 
Bureau uses examination to uncover creation of products that exploit 
consumers’ lack of understanding of costs and risks. The statute asks 
whether consumers understand risks, costs, and conditions—as opposed to 
requiring mere knowledge—and takes into account consumer appreciation 
of risks, including the risk that the consumer will use a given feature. 
Because Dodd-Frank explicitly bars the CFPB from imposing usury limits, 
the implication is that other substantive regulation of credit products is 
authorized, particularly under the agency’s anti-abuse power, to eliminate 
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confusing intricacies that impair consumer understanding.125 The CFPB is 
looking for pricing terms that are complex and changing and that include 
features that research shows consumers do not pay attention to but which 
come back to bite them. 
Furthermore, the template asks whether a product or service is marketed 
to particular populations, such as students or young adults, the elderly, 
minorities, immigrants, military, those with limited education or English 
proficiency, low-income consumers, consumers receiving public assistance, 
or those who have recently experienced financial distress or who have low 
credit scores.126 While some of these categories concern illegal 
discrimination based on suspect categorizations such as race and age, a 
number of the categories are indicative of vulnerability to exploitation. The 
CFPB seems to be looking for abuse in the form of targeting those who may 
have particular difficulty appreciating risks. Another section of the template 
focuses on sales force incentives and calls for examination of both 
compensation based on particular products sold without consideration of 
outcomes, such as default rates, and marketing materials, such as 
advertising that features teaser rates without important conditions or that 
targets consumers not likely to benefit from a product.127 Once again, one 
can see that the CFPB is searching for exploitation of lack of consumer 
understanding of risks, costs, and conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The CFPB’s early articulation of its UDAAP authority is exciting 
because it represents a turn away from mere disclosure to more substantive 
consumer protection and provides a model that states could follow. The 
CFPB’s new power to regulate abusive acts and practices gives it the means 
to target and eliminate consumer financial products that show signs of 
having been designed to exploit consumer misunderstanding of costs and 
risks. Furthermore, the CFPB’s examination handbook, particularly in its 
risk assessment template, suggests that the agency is bringing to bear 
lessons of behavioral economics in its search for patterns of consumer error 
in the use of financial products. Of course, the CFPB’s success in curbing 
abuses will depend on follow-through—particularly how hard it pushes 
financial institutions to stop marketing exploitative products and its 
willingness to use enforcement actions when subtler pressure does not 
accomplish this mission. Prevention of consumer abuse will also require 
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sticking with the project over time, even when the mania of a market bubble 
threatens to grip us again. 
 
